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I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence is often a scar of poverty. Welfare reform legislation
attempted to address the interplay between domestic violence and socioeconomic status by adopting the Family Violence Option in the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.1 While the Family
Violence Option of TANF might serve as Congressional recognition that
domestic violence is an exacerbating issue for low-income women, the
exception comes with little teeth for actual victims. The Family Violence
Option provides states with the authority to voluntarily waive TANF
benefit requirements (such as term limits and child support cooperation
mandates) for screened domestic violence victims on their rolls, but despite
its good intentions of loosening strict qualifications for victims, it is failing
to achieve this result in reality.2 Across the nation, states are underutilizing the Family Violence Option. While all states have either formally
adopted the Family Violence Option or claim to have adopted a comparable
policy, utilization rates of domestic violence waivers are surprisingly low,
suggesting that implementing the Family Violence Option has been
ineffective.3 Yet, the welfare system continues to be characterized by
strict, punitive requirements, making compliance and benefits impossible
for many victims of domestic violence.
As set forth more fully below, crafting welfare subsidies for domestic
violence victims requires acknowledging the dual oppression inherent in
domestic violence specifically and in poverty generally. After thorough
exploration of the punitive, racist, and sexist history of our nation‘s welfare
laws, complicated by the closely-associated issue of domestic violence and
reports of welfare legislation‘s continued failure, it becomes clear that a
new policy approach is needed. This Article argues that without a more
accommodating welfare policy approach towards poor domestic violence
victims, we will continue to lessen their chances of escaping both their
abusers and society‘s subordination of the poor, thus reinforcing poverty
and abuse rather than eliminating it. Reforming TANF to properly address
the practical complications of domestic violence will require providing
more comprehensive benefits across the board, re-evaluating the
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (2006) (describing the components of the optional
certification states can submit to the Secretary of Labor in order to waive TANF
mandates for domestic violence victims).
2. See Laurie Pompa, The Family Violence Option in Texas: Why Is It Failing to
Aid Domestic Violence Victims on Welfare and What to Do About It, 16 TEX. J. WOMEN
& L. 241, 251 (2007) (citing a study of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) benefit recipients in Houston and San Antonio, where less than fifteen percent
of the victims state they could meet TANF requirements without interference from their
partners, showing the disadvantages victims face when they did not use the waiver).
3. See id. at 250 (citing a study conducted in New York where only a third of all
the individuals who were referred to domestic violence liaisons received waivers).
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effectiveness of all of the restrictions that currently accompany receipt of
TANF benefits, incorporating higher educational incentives,
acknowledging realistic restraints on beneficiaries‘ income potential, and
reinstating an enforceable right to benefits. Ultimately, future welfare
reform efforts need to reflect the reality that comprehensive and accessible
subsidies are imperative for many victims to escape both the dominion of
domestic violence and poverty and we need to make sure our policymakers
understand this is not optional.
II. THE HISTORY OF WELFARE—PUNITIVE, SEXIST, AND RACIST ROOTS
The tradition of inadequate poverty laws in the United States includes a
narrative of charity, but it is also pervaded with racist and sexist
stereotypes.4 The state and federal government aid programs we are most
familiar with today (i.e., Social Security, unemployment compensation,
etc.) were initially developed to support ―white, male workers and the
white women and children dependent upon their wages while they
excluded a huge segment of poor women of color and their children.‖5
From these aid programs‘ inception, the government has characterized
relief as a temporary solution, and beneficiaries were expected to be
capable of participating in society as wage earners.6 ―Such persons might
need aid because their wages were too low to survive on them; or they
might need aid due to economic depression or other causes of
unemployment that were beyond the individual‘s control.‖7 However,
―most able-bodied poor were believed, in the end to be morally responsible
for their own poverty,‖ and thus benefits were ―stingy‖ and requirements
were ―disciplinary‖ in nature ―so as not to encourage dependency.‖8 These
themes have remained constant throughout the history of welfare
initiatives.
A. Mothers’ Pension State Initiatives
As welfare benefits developed, sexism became ingrained in the policy
directives. What we have come to know as welfare was designed from its
inception to target poor mothers and children without fathers.9 Mothers‘
4. See Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 643, 648 (2009) (arguing that these policies were infused with race,
class, and gender bias).
5. Id. (detailing how the welfare system was influenced by race, class, and gender
in a discriminatory manner).
6. WELFARE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY AND POLITICS 1
(Gwendolyn Mink & Rickie Solinger eds., 2003) [hereinafter WELFARE].
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1-2.
9. Id. at 1.
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pensions were ―enacted by state governments during the 1910s and were
implemented by localities‖ affirming the view that the ―mother-care of
children was the best form of care.‖10
These policies made it
hypothetically possible for mothers to ―meet their caregiving
responsibilities by providing a surrogate for a husband‘s income‖ but in
practice could not support most families and excluded some mothers
outright.11 ―Pensions provided economic support only to the ‗best‘
mothers, even so regulating their dietary, kinship and other cultural
conditions to ensure their continued worthiness as mothers.‖12 This early
form of welfare ―recognized the value of care only when mothers met
certain cultural, racial, and moral standards.‖13
Mothers‘ pensions thus established two pervasive stereotypes with
regard to women‘s roles and managing stringent resources. First, mothers
were expected to perform the work of caregiving, yet ―the value of that
work depended on the culture, race, and morality of the caregiver.‖14
Secondly, ―even mothers who enjoyed social approbation and support had
to earn and defend it by submitting to social controls.‖15 The Social
Security Act of 1935, creating the Aid to Dependent Children program,
also inherited these subordinating ―legacies.‖16
B. The Aid to Dependent Children Program (ADC) & Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC)
ADC was ―designed for poor mothers and their children and [was]
originally intended to support the widows of working men.‖ 17 However,
post World War II, ADC rolls swelled from approximately 900,000 in 1945
to almost 3 million in 1960.18 At this time, the proportion of households
that were made up of divorced or unmarried mothers started to increase,
accompanied by a decrease in households headed by widows (likely due to
the end of the War).19 In addition, the number of African-American
families receiving welfare benefits increased, especially as poor blacks
migrated north.20
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gustafson, supra note 4, at 648 (showing how the Social Security Act created a
gender bias program).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 649 (stating that the number rose as more poor African-American
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States continued to enforce gender and cultural norms though their
implementation of ADC. Many states and locales adopted ―suitable home‖
and ―substitute parent‖ rules.21 These were essentially moral impositions,
arbitrarily applied, often discriminating against women of color, especially
in the South.22 Many welfare offices even engaged in midnight raids to
police ―man in the house‖ rules.23 These welfare requirements represented
a growing concern about unmarried women filling the welfare roles.24
ADC was later renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC).25 Under AFDC, anyone who met the threshold income level to
receive benefits could do so without any time constraints and it encouraged
the states to spend money underwriting welfare subsidies by providing
matching grants.26 In contrast to today‘s welfare policy, AFDC appears
extremely generous, but its implementation also faced sexist and racist
obstacles. In 1965, Daniel Patrick Moynihan promoted the idea ―that the
problems of inner cities—poverty, joblessness, and crime—could be traced
to a ‗tangle of pathology‘ perpetuated by unmarried black mothers.‖27 The
popular Moynihan study portrayed low-income African-American mothers
as a social threat ―because they gave birth to and raised sons who became
the criminal, urban underclass.‖28 These stereotypes became closely
associated with welfare recipients and induced morally focused state
regulations, often culminating in racist and sexist policies.
Some progress was eventually made in combating the sexist implications
of these welfare laws. In 1968, the United States Supreme Court struck
down Alabama‘s ―substitute father‖ rule in King v. Smith, affirming the
District Court‘s holding that the regulation was inconsistent with the Social
Security Act and the Equal Protection Clause.29 The substitute father rule
families from the agricultural south were migrating North for economic opportunity in
more industrialized cities).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id. (stating that the reason for the raids was to catch men sleeping in the
same home, meaning the woman was morally unfit to receive aid or there was another
wage-earner living in the home).
25. Id. at 651; see also DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP‘T OF LABOR, THE
NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965).
26. Timothy Casey et al., TANF Reauthorization Round II—An Opportunity to
Improve the Safety Net for Women and Children, 14 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 65
(2009) [hereinafter Casey et al., TANF Reauthorization] (showing the difference
between AFDC and TANF was largely the ―block grant,‖ which was a fixed amount
that was not dependent on the amount of state program expenditures).
27. Gustafson, supra note 4, at 650 (citing DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S.
DEP‘T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 30 (1965)).
28. Id. at 651.
29. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311-13 (1968) (citing Smith v. King, 277 F.
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had previously ―denie[d] aid to an otherwise eligible needy child on the
basis that his substitute parent is not absent from the home.‖30 Under the
statute, an ―able-bodied man, married or single, [wa]s considered a
substitute father of all the children of the [welfare] applicant‖ if (1) ―he
live[s] in the home with the . . . mother for the purposes of cohabitation‖;
(2) ―he visits (the home) frequently for the purpose of cohabiting with
the . . . mother‖; or (3) he cohabited with the mother elsewhere.31
―Cohabitation‖ essentially was a proxy for sexual relations.32
The Supreme Court, in its analysis, noted welfare‘s history of preferring
the ―worthy poor.‖33 It specifically noted, ―both the House and Senate
Committee Reports on the Social Security Act of 1935 indicate that states
participating in AFDC were free to impose eligibility requirements relating
to the ‗moral character‘ of applicants.‖34 However, in striking down the
substitute father regulation the Court stated ―that immorality and
illegitimacy should be dealt with through rehabilitative measures rather
than measures that punish dependent children, and that protection of such
children is the paramount goal of AFDC.‖35 Thus began welfare‘s
paradigm shift; focusing on women receiving welfare, rather than the men
involved in their lives. However, this shift in perspective also directed the
punitive implications of welfare almost exclusively towards women.
In addition to sexism, racism also continued to remain present and
prominent in welfare policies. In the 1970s, then California Governor
Ronald Reagan used the symbol of the ―welfare queen‖ to promote his
platform of a smaller government while campaigning for President of the
United States.36 ―Reagan used references to the welfare queen to portray
an image of widespread depravity and criminality among low-income

Supp. 31 (D.C.M.D. Ala. 1967)) (failing to reach the constitutional question). But see
id. at 334 (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court follows a statutory path in
order to reach the same result that should or could be reached on constitutional
grounds).
30. See id. at 313-14 (majority opinion) (explaining that Alabama grants aid only
when there is a continuous absence of ―a parent‖ from the home).
31. See id. (citing the Alabama Manual for Administration of Public Assistance, pt.
I, c. II, § VI).
32. See id. at 314 (quoting officials responsible for the administration of Alabama‘s
AFDC as establishing that this word typically refers to sexual relations).
33. See id. at 320 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining past limitations on
public assistance for those considered incapable of reform).
34. Id. at 321.
35. See id. at 325 (inferring Congressional intent through its passage of statutes
requiring state programs to improve housing, offer family planning services, and
establish programs to determine paternity and secure financial support for illegitimate
children).
36. Gustafson, supra note 4, at 653.
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women of color.‖37 Despite this factual misrepresentation, the symbolic
rhetoric of the ―welfare queen‖ seduced public perception.38 The welfare
queen stereotype played a dominant role in both Reagan‘s presidential
campaigns as well as his administration‘s policies. ―In Reagan‘s view, the
poor, and not the welfare bureaucracies, were the sources of fraud and
waste.‖39 Rather than treating the exceptional cases of welfare fraud and
abuse ―as the exceptions they were,‖ politicians like Reagan, the media,
and the public adopted them as the archetype, typifying poor black mothers
as the women on welfare.40 They were described as the ―perfect examples
of what welfare recipients become over the course of years on the dole.‖41
C. Contemporary Welfare Policy—Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF)
Concerns about welfare abuse and debates as to whether or not it was
wasteful spending grew in the 1990s. In 1996, Congress enacted the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA), which dramatically reformed the state of welfare.42
PRWORA replaced AFDC with TANF and implemented strict maximum
time requirements and qualifications for subsidies as well as a block grant
system, which does not fluctuate depending on how many people the state
is serving.43
Sexist and racist stereotypes continued to influence welfare reform. In
the debates leading up to a vote on TANF, federal legislators employed
these stereotypes to describe welfare recipients.44
John Mica, a
37. Id.
38. See id. (analyzing that because welfare cheating has always been an issue in

poverty politics, even with these ―factual inaccuracies‖ Reagan‘s descriptions resonated
with the public).
39. Id. at 656.
40. Id. at 656-57.
41. Id. at 657 n.64 (showing how black mothers came to bear much of the stigma
associated with welfare without poverty being exclusive to women of color).
42. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
43. Casey et al., TANF Reauthorization, supra note 26, at 1; see also R. KENT
WEAVER, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE STRUCTURE OF THE TANF BLOCK GRANT
1 (Policy Brief No. 22, 2002) (describing federal expenditures under TANF as fixed at
approximately $16.5 billion per year with states‘ shares based on the amount received
under the AFDC program without providing for adjustments related to the size of the
individual state‘s caseload). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) (establishing
provisions for TANF block grants under Title IV of the Social Security Act).
44. See Gustafson, supra note 4, at 660 n.81 (quoting Beverly Horsburgh,
Schrödinger’s Cat, Eugenics, and the Compulsory Sterilization of Welfare Mothers:
Deconstructing an Old/New Rhetoric and Constructing the Reproductive Right to
Natality for Low-Income Women of Color, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 565-66 (1996))
(identifying lawmakers who used caged animals, wolves, and alligators as stereotypes
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Congressman from Florida, ―held up a sign during a congressional debate
that read, ‗Don‘t feed the alligators.‘‖45 On the House floor, he then argued
that ―providing aid to poor women would do nothing but spur them to
reproduce, entice them to return for more free handouts, and threaten the
general public safety.‖46
The sexism written into PRWORA is astonishing. The factual findings
for Congress explicitly found that marriage was not only an integral piece
of the infrastructure for a stable society but an essential support that a
society needs for the successful promotion of a child‘s best interests.47 The
purpose of TANF grants was set forth as ―end[ing] the dependence of
needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work,
and marriage‖; ―prevent[ing] and reduc[ing] the incidence of out-ofwedlock pregnancies‖; and ―encourage[ing] the formation . . . of twoparent families.‖48 This emphasis on marriage and devaluing single
motherhood is significant. The statute explicitly aims to decrease single
motherhood by making these women less dependent on the government
and more dependent on men. Rather than incorporating programs and
educational opportunities statistically proven to lead to economic selfsufficiency, TANF implementation limits these opportunities, encouraging
women to turn to marriage instead and diverting precious federal resources
to this purpose. ―Under the new regulations promulgated under the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2006, obtaining a bachelor‘s or master‘s degree is
specifically excluded from the activities that constitute work for the
purposes of TANF.‖49 Furthermore, many states then started to abandon
programs that included offering post-secondary education for welfare
recipients.50 These intentions to exclude autonomous alternatives to
marriage in order to achieve economic self-sufficiency are significant
indicators of the sexism embedded in TANF.
Statistics also indicate that poverty laws affect more women in general
due to the fact that women constitute the majority of our country‘s poor.51
for welfare recipients).
45. See id. at 660.
46. Id. at 660-61.
47. Pub L. No. 104-193, § 101.
48. Id. § 404.
49. See Jasmin Sethi, Lessons for Social Scientists and Politicians: An Analysis of
Welfare Reform, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL‘Y 5, 30 (2010) (arguing that under
the new regulations under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2006, the most important
determinant, higher education, which could most help welfare recipients leave the
program, was not permitted under TANF).
50. Id.
51. Casey et al., TANF Reauthorization, supra note 26, at 2 (arguing that women
constitute the majority of the poor for a multitude of reasons which include the
statistics of TANF recipients, their pivotal importance to certain responsibilities, such
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Women are disproportionately dependent on TANF and its subsidies.
―Women are forty percent more likely to be poor than men.‖ 52 ―Women
are less likely to be employed than men,‖ and they earn less on each dollar
than similarly situated male colleagues.53 Approximately ninety percent of
adult TANF recipients are single mothers who are also more likely to be
poor.54 However, it is noteworthy to distinguish that, while single mothers
have an exceptionally high poverty rate of over thirty-five percent, they are
not the majority of our underclass, as our societal perceptions tend to
assume.55
Cultural norms of worthiness and animus toward the poor continue to be
evident in contemporary welfare reform. ―The federal economic stimulus
legislation—the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act—increased
benefits for Food Stamp, Social Security, SSI and Unemployment
Compensation recipients, but did not increase benefits for TANF
recipients . . . .‖56 This conscious exclusion was made despite the fact that
these groups of people were most likely to spend benefit increases quickly,
consistent with the Act‘s underlying economic stimulus intentions.57
Accordingly, along with TANF came a slew of harsh requirements for
welfare recipients to remain eligible for benefits. It purposefully omitted
cash aid as a federal entitlement for qualified families and instead instituted
mandatory work requirements, time limits, child support cooperation, and
marriage promotion program participation.58 TANF‘s changes greatly
constrained serving impoverished American families in general, but also
affected domestic violence victims in particular.

as family care responsibilities, that seem to fall to women disproportionately).
52. Id. at 2.
53. Id.
54. TIMOTHY CASEY ET AL., LEGAL MOMENTUM & NAT‘L RES. CTR. ON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, NOT ENOUGH: WHAT TANF OFFERS FAMILY VIOLENCE VICTIMS 2 (2010),
http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/pdfs/not-enough-what-tanf-offers.pdf
[hereinafter CASEY ET AL., NOT ENOUGH] (reporting the high poverty rate of single
mothers at over thirty-five percent).
55. Id.; see also Sara McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, Single Mothers, the
Underclass, and Social Policy, 501 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 92, 99 (1989)
(promoting universal programs that encourage economic independence among single
mothers to counteract the growth of an underclass too dependent on welfare).
56. See Casey et al., TANF Reauthorization, supra note 26, at 1-2 (stating that this
lack of increase in benefits flew in the face of the fact that no group was more needy or
had such a higher rate of children).
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id. at 5-7, 9 (setting a sixty month time limit and requiring cooperation in
establishing paternity and pursuing child support, as requirements for eligibility as well
as providing funding for projects that promoted marriage and responsible fatherhood).
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III. THE CORRELATION OF WELFARE AND VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
As noted above, welfare policy is ridden with sexist and racist
oppression. Thus, it is even more significant that welfare and poverty also
go hand in hand with domestic violence. ―Domestic violence is, at its core,
a system of power and control by the abuser over the victim.‖ 59 There is a
critical role of women‘s agency and autonomy that needs to drive legal
remedies for domestic violence. Welfare reform policy, as an economic
lifeline for escaping abuse, has to take this into account. If welfare reform
serves to punish the ―unworthy‖ poor women who are perceived to
comprise its rolls, it also undermines the chances of domestic violence
victims to achieve economic autonomy, central to their escape of abuse. It
undermines these chances despite the fact that domestic violence victims
arguably did not relegate themselves to a position of lazy government
dependency, but rather are forced by their dominantly male abusers to seek
assistance as a result of the need to escape violence.
Domestic violence is most often associated with physical abuse, but it
has psychological and economic repercussions as well.60 It ultimately
makes economic self-sufficiency harder to achieve for its victims.61
Women are the vast majority of victims of domestic violence and sexual
assault.62 Although domestic violence affects women from all different
backgrounds, low-income women are even more likely to be abused.63
―Studies show that 14% to 32% of welfare recipients are [currently] in
abusive relationships, and more than half the women in a study who were
welfare recipients had been the victims of violence at some time.‖64
Domestic violence exacerbates variables of poverty. It often forces a
choice of staying in an abusive relationship or risking homelessness.65
Women are often coerced to return to their abusers as a result of economic
reality, which ironically often follows a period of escalated violence after
separation in order to coerce reconciliation.66 Domestic violence victims
also suffer from interference with their employment. ―Studies indicate that
between 35% and 56% of employed abused women surveyed were
harassed at work by their abusive partners, and that between one-fourth and
59. Id. at 2 (listing the most commonly associated types of violence as physical
attacks, psychological abuse, and threats to various family members or property).
60. Id. at 1-2.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 3.
66. Id.
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one-half of domestic violence victims reported losing a job at least in part
to domestic violence.‖67 This interference can often result in destabilizing
a victim‘s economic self-sufficiency capabilities, driving many victims to
resort to TANF benefits. These victims are particularly vulnerable to
coercion by their abuser. For these victims, the availability of TANF is
crucial for economic self-sufficiency. For many victims, employment is
not a realistic source of income and support because of a lack of childcare,
continued abuse, poor health, and poor employment history as a result of
abuse.68 For these victims, the availability of TANF is particularly critical
for starting a new life free from abuse.
Including an opportunity for states to provide exceptions to TANF‘s
harsh requirements for cases that involve domestic violence shows some
recognition that welfare may be a necessary solution for these families, and
that achieving economic self-sufficiency can take some incalculable time.
In 1994, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in
an effort to strengthen support services for victims of family violence.69
However, victims still face overwhelming obstacles in leaving their abuser
and it is ―particularly difficult for low-income women to obtain economic
self-sufficiency because they have fewer resources.‖70 Thus, TANF
subsidies will continue playing an important role in making escape from
abuse possible.
IV. TANF‘S FAMILY VIOLENCE OPTION – AN ATTEMPT TO MITIGATE THE
HARSH REQUIREMENTS OF WELFARE REFORM
Congress‘s recognition of the importance of addressing how welfare
shapes economic opportunity for domestic violence victims is a step in the
right direction. Including the Family Violence Option in TANF was an
explicit legal recognition that domestic violence and poverty are specially
linked and that making welfare available to victims is imperative.71
However, what harsh requirements are even eligible to be waived for
domestic violence victims varies from state to state.72 Thus, an in depth
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
142 Cong. Rec. S8141 (daily ed. July 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Paul
Wellstone) (―I want to make sure that these women and these children throughout our
country, for whom the welfare system has been sometimes the only alternative to these
very dangerous homes, receive the kind of special services and assistance that they
need. In the absence of the passing of this amendment, all too many women and
children could find themselves forced back into these very dangerous homes.‖).
72. LEGAL MOMENTUM, FAMILY VIOLENCE OPTION: STATE BY STATE SUMMARY
(2004),
http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/pdfs/www66_appendix_d_family_violence_option.pdf.
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analysis of the various requirements TANF recipients are required to
comply with in order to receive benefits is valuable in analyzing why
implementation of the Family Violence option is not working across the
states.
A. Time Limits
Under TANF, no individual can receive benefits longer than an
aggregate period of five years, consecutive or not.73 This requirement,
without some further exception, poses great threat for victims of domestic
violence as it often takes decades to break the cycles of violence.
Additionally, many states have enacted shorter periods of eligibility,
making it even more difficult for victims to benefit for this public
assistance.
B. Work Requirements
TANF also imposed strict work requirements, which could be
devastating to domestic violence victims. While TANF imposes work
requirements generally, the states enact their own specific rules. In Texas,
an individual must work at least thirty hours a week or participate for
twenty hours a week in an activity established under the job opportunities
program.74 Victims dealing with harassment or other conditions of
domestic abuse may struggle to meet these requirements, for which the
penalty for failing to adhere is loss of benefits entirely. According to Legal
Momentum, forty-four percent of employed adults ―have personally
experienced the effects of domestic violence in their workplaces, and
employees consider domestic violence as important a workplace issue as
terrorism, job insecurity, and employee theft.‖75 These requirements are
another example of how, without the Family Violence Option, TANF may
strictly force victims to choose between their own well-being and
continued financial support. Although education is a proven resource for
increasing economic self-sufficiency, post-secondary education is not a
legitimate work requirement substitute in many states.76
73. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A) (2000) (―A State to which a grant is made under
section 603 shall not use any part of the grant to provide assistance to a family that
includes an adult who has received assistance under any State program funded under
this part attributable to funds provided by the Federal Government, for 60 months
(whether or not consecutive) after the date the State program funded under this part
commences . . . .‖).
74. Pompa, supra note 2, at 248.
75. Legal Momentum, Statistics: Understanding the Effects of Domestic Violence,
Sexual
Assault
&
Stalking
on
Housing
&
the
Workplace,
http://www.legalmomentum.org/our-work/domestic-violence/statistics-understandingthe.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
76. Sethi, supra note 49, at 30.
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C. Child Support Cooperation
Child support recovery cooperation requirements also have the
potential to exclude domestic violence victims.77 These requirements
mandate a victim to disclose the name of her abuser and whether he is the
father of her children and to participate in any state claims for child support
against him. For domestic violence victims who have experienced the
failure of the system when the system did not protect them (whether from
violated restraining orders, victim arrests, etc.) time and time again, these
requirements ask them to balance whether food on the table or their
whereabouts being unknown to their abusers is more important.
D. Marriage Promotion
TANF also makes $150 million a year in federal funding available
to states that create projects promoting marriage and responsible
fatherhood.78 States can make participation in these programs mandatory,
with the exception of domestic violence victims, but because screening can
be so difficult in assessing whether a welfare recipient is a victim, the
participation requirements still pose a detriment to victims.
E. Immigrant Restrictions
TANF also imposes requirements in immigrant eligibility. The
1996 TANF reform narrowed immigrant eligibility for welfare subsidies.79
Legal immigrants cannot receive benefits unless they have resided in the
United States for at least five years. This requirement ignores the fact that
immigrant women experience poverty at a much higher rate than nativeborn women and are also more likely to be victims of domestic violence,
sexual assault, and human trafficking.80 Exceptions for battered immigrant
victims do exist, and victims of domestic violence who are also immigrants
may qualify for TANF once they have a pending or approved VAWA
application or approved application for a family sponsored visa. However,
qualifying for these exceptions can take lengthy amounts of time and
involves navigating confusing bureaucracy.81 These challenges ultimately
foreclose TANF benefits for many immigrant victims.
F. Family Caps
As of July 2007, fifteen states had child exclusion policies, capping a
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Casey et al., TANF Reauthorization, supra note 26, at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
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family‘s grant of welfare benefits at the number of children existing at the
time of application for benefits.82 Thus, a child‘s needs are ignored if a
child is born into a family receiving TANF benefits, even though the cost
increment averages only an additional $100 per month.83 These policies
are premised on the belief that ―women have children to get higher TANF
benefits.‖84 Seeing as many abusers use sexual violence as abuse, this
requirement may further harm domestic violence victims.
G. The Family Violence Option
Recognizing that many of these requirements often exclude domestic
violence victims‘ practical eligibility, Congress included an exception in
TANF for domestic violence victims. The Family Violence Option
provides states with the opportunity to voluntarily waive some of the harsh
program requirements associated with TANF. The statutory language sets
forth the options as follows:
(7) Optional certification of standards and procedures to ensure that the
State will screen for and identify domestic violence
(A) In general
At the option of the State, a certification by the chief executive officer
of the State that the State has established and is enforcing standards
and procedures to—
(i) screen and identify individuals receiving assistance under this
part with a history of domestic violence while maintaining the
confidentiality of such individuals;
(ii) refer such individuals to counseling and supportive services;
and
(iii) waive, pursuant to a determination of good cause, other
program requirements such as time limits (for so long as
necessary) for individuals receiving assistance, residency
requirements, child support cooperation requirements, and family
cap provisions, in cases where compliance with such requirements
would make it more difficult for individuals receiving assistance
under this part to escape domestic violence or unfairly penalize
such individuals who are or have been victimized by such
violence, or individuals who are at risk of further domestic
85
violence.

The legislation also included a Hardship Exception, specifically giving
the states the opportunity to opt out domestic violence victims from the
TANF‘s temporal caps. The statute sets forth the guidelines for granting
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (2006).
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specific hardship exceptions as follows:
(C) Hardship exception
(i) In general
The State may exempt a family from the application of
subparagraph (A) by reason of hardship or if the family includes
an individual who has been battered or subjected to extreme
cruelty.
(ii) Limitation
The average monthly number of families with respect to which an
exemption made by a State under clause (i) is in effect for a fiscal
year shall not exceed 20 percent of the average monthly number of
families to which assistance is provided under the State program
funded under this part during the fiscal year or the immediately
preceding fiscal year (but not both), as the State may elect.
(iii) Battered or subject to extreme cruelty defined
For purposes of clause (i), an individual has been battered or
subjected to extreme cruelty if the individual has been subjected
to—
(I) physical acts that resulted in, or threatened to result in,
physical injury to the individual;
(II) sexual abuse;
(III) sexual activity involving a dependent child;
(IV) being forced as the caretaker relative of a dependent child
to engage in nonconsensual sexual acts or activities;
(V) threats of, or attempts at, physical or sexual abuse;
(VI) mental abuse; or
86
(VII) neglect or deprivation of medical care.

Thus, the Family Violence Option makes it conceivably possible to
exempt domestic violence victims from oppressive welfare requirements,
such as the harsh time limit, forced child support, and strict work
requirements. However, in practice the voluntary waiver on behalf of the
states is not yielding results that support the idea that domestic violence
victims are being afforded the exceptions they desperately need to survive
and escape abuse. The Hardship Exception limits the number of
exemptions each state can grant to no more than twenty percent of the
average number of families receiving assistance. These limits exist despite
the fact that statistics suggest thirty-two percent of welfare recipients are
currently victims of domestic violence and half of recipients have been
victims at some point in the past.87 At a minimum, these limits statutorily
exclude up to twelve percent of reporting victims who needed exemptions.
Because domestic violence is highly underreported, these limits likely
exclude even more victims than these statistics indicate.
86. Id. § 608(a)(7)(C)(iii).
87. Casey et al., TANF Reauthorization, supra note 26, at 5.
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V. THE FAILED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FAMILY VIOLENCE OPTION
As of 2010, ―[a]ll states have either formally certified adoption of the
Family Violence Option (41) or reported to the federal government
adoption of a comparable policy.‖88 However, despite its relatively
widespread adoption, the utilization rates of domestic violence waivers are
surprising low.89 Systematic information about Family Violence Option
administration is virtually nonexistent. There is, however, substantial
evidence that TANF case workers often fail to effectively screen for
domestic violence and/or to offer waivers and service referrals when
appropriate.90
A post-TANF enactment survey of New York TANF applicants found
that most were not being screened properly for indications of domestic
violence and that those who did identify themselves as victims were not
properly referred for services.91 The following case study and national
survey illustrate further representative examples of how and why the
Family Violence Option is failing low-income domestic violence victims.
A. Case Study: California
In 1998, California adopted the Family Violence Option in what they
called the California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids program
(CalWORKS).92
LIFETIME, a California statewide membership
organization of low-income parents in California which provides peerbased support and advocacy services to help hundreds of CalWORKs
parents each year, produced a report in 2005 examining the efficacy of the
Family Violence Option adopted in California.93 The report‘s key findings
were clear in illustrating that the program was not effectively serving high
percentages of domestic violence victims in the CalWORKs program.
Key findings indicated that one third of the mothers who participated in
the survey reported that ―they were victims of domestic violence but never
received information about their eligibility for domestic violence
counseling and services, and/or have been denied access to domestic
violence counseling, and services, or waivers.‖94 On average, during any
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

CASEY ET AL., NOT ENOUGH, supra note 54, at 2.
Pompa, supra note 2, at 249.
Casey et al., TANF Reauthorization, supra note 26, at 8.
Id.
DIANA SPATZ & SHEILA KATZ, LIFETIME, FAMILY VIOLENCE IS NOT AN OPTION:
THE FAILURE OF CALWORKS TO SERVE BATTERED WOMEN WITH CHILDREN 9 (2005)
http://www.geds-tophds.org/Approved%20to%20post%20on%20website/FVNO%20Final%2010.05.pdf.
93. Id. at 10.
94. Id. at 12.
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given month in 2004, California state data indicated that only one percent
of the state‘s welfare caseload received services for domestic violence.
Even though Los Angeles County had the highest number of CalWORKs
mothers receiving domestic violence services, as a percentage of the
county‘s caseload, less than 1.6% of the county‘s caseload received
services in 2004.95 Of the thirteen counties analyzed from 1999 to 2004,
twelve counties provided domestic violence services to less than four
percent of their CalWORKs caseload.96
Although mothers may benefit from domestic violence services, ―state
data indicated that waivers [from welfare to work requirements] were not
being granted at all,‖ demonstrating that the exceptions embodied in the
federal Family Violence Option were not actually being extended.97
Perhaps the saddest example of this was the finding that ―during October
2004, [although] 1,763 mothers were referred to or receiving domestic
violence services in Los Angeles County[,] . . . none were granted waivers
from welfare to work activities.‖98
While the Family Violence Option has been adopted in California, its
intended protections are not being successfully implemented. California‘s
failure is being mirrored across the country. Standing alone, domestic
violence screening and proper referrals are difficult to manage, but it is
clear that their implementation in California has not been successful either.
Thus, the Family Violence Option is doing limited work for domestic
violence victims, despite its good intentions.
B. National Indications of Failure—The Legal Momentum Report
Legal Momentum recently released a report on the effectiveness of
TANF and the Family Violence Option. Legal Momentum and the
National Resource Center on Domestic Violence conducted a qualitative
national survey in the fall of 2009 of ―nearly 600 staff from domestic
violence programs and other agencies working with victims on TANF
related issues.‖99 Their findings indicated that the Family Violence Option
is inadequately addressing victims‘ unique issues across the country.
According to the report, victims across the country are not consistently
and effectively screened or notified of family violence specific responses,
waivers, or protections.100 Concerns identified by respondents included
conducting interviews of applicants in the presence of abusive partners and
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
CASEY ET AL., NOT ENOUGH, supra note 54, at 2-3.
Id. at 3-10.
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employing workers who were not trained in family violence or who sought
to disqualify applicants from eligibility.101 Furthermore, those victims who
did disclose domestic violence were not consistently receiving the
appropriate waivers or necessary protections to be safe.102 Many
respondents rated the Family Violence time limit extension and work
requirement exemption policies as ineffective.103 The Report indicates that
professionals working with domestic violence victims across the nation
view the implementation of the Family Violence Option in various states as
inadequate. One respondent reported,
Victims can apply but access is very subjective. Unless a woman was
recently beaten by her abuser she is not seen as a victim of domestic
violence that should be waived from the employment requirements and
she is told she must complete the 25 job searches.
There is no
consideration of the mental health aspect, ability to get a job, court dates,
emotional confusion about the abuse and loss of being who she is. There
104
will not be a waiver.

Another respondent commented on the effect of denying waivers for
time limits noting, ―any time limit to benefits for survivors is artificial as a
victim‘s ability to live free from domestic violence is more a result of her
batterer‘s behavior than it is anything she can do.‖105
These responses suggest that the system of exempting victims is not
working. The system does not adequately account for the realistic
experiences of domestic violence and thus is not resulting in its intended
waiver of exemptions. As a result, welfare reform has to be revisited and
restructured in order to make TANF a viable option for victims of violence.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FAILING TO PROVIDE FOR IMPOVERISHED
VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
It is clear that the Family Violence Option is not successful in screening
and exempting domestic violence victims seeking TANF from its harsh
temporal and reporting restrictions. Because TANF is a lifeline for so
many victims of abuse, its policy failure is particularly troublesome.
Without effective access to welfare subsidies, many women are coerced to
remain with, or return to, their abuser. Essentially, these victims are dually
punished: first, by the physical and psychological abuse inflicted by their
abusers, and second, by TANF, an economic lifeline that is practically
foreclosed by the government due to the racist and sexist assumptions
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
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which motivated welfare reform, despite social science research that refutes
their accuracy, as well as unrealistic expectations that domestic violence is
something we can effectively screen out. Domestic violence victims are
thus subjected to two systems of oppression that are intimately intertwined.
Because violence and poverty will continue to intersect, welfare policies
must address both issues simultaneously in order to be effective. Although
many policy changes have been suggested, the system needs
comprehensive reform. The Legal Momentum Report referenced above
suggests that multiple reforms are needed to more appropriately address the
needs of low-income victims of family violence. Their policy suggestions
include increasing the following: minimum wage to a living wage, access
to childcare, training for TANF and welfare caseworkers regarding
domestic and sexual violence, transportation service, emergency relocation
and other related assistance to victims fleeing domestic violence, screening
for family violence, TANF benefit levels, and general access to subsidies
and opportunities for victims to pursue higher education.106 Other
advocates of reform echo these concerns.107
The opportunity to make substantial reform to our nation‘s welfare
policies is quickly approaching as TANF must be reauthorized again by
September 30, 2011.108 As a result, policymakers need to take into account
case studies like California‘s and national surveys indicating widespread
policy failures for domestic violence victims; they are clear indications that
an overhaul of the current welfare system is needed.
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Because TANF does not adequately take into account the realities of
both poverty and domestic violence, our welfare reform policies have to
change. It is critical to note that while welfare workers can be trained on
better approaches, screening efforts are inherently compromised by the
reality of domestic violence. Domestic violence is often experienced
privately and victims are reluctant to come forward. If they do come
forward and their abusers find out, they are often subjected to further
violence. Compounding this problem, if they come forward to authorities,

106. Id. at 15-17.
107. Casey et al., TANF Reauthorization, supra note 26, at 9.
108. TANF has to undergo Reauthorization periodically in order to maintain funding

and continuation of its programs. The TANF block grant program was scheduled for
reauthorization in 2010. However, Congress did not work on legislation to reauthorize
the program. Congress extended the TANF block grant through September 30, 2011 as
part of the Claims Resolution Act. PUB.L. 111-291, December 8, 2010, 124 Stat 3064.
As a result, this Fall poses a powerful opportunity address the legislation‘s
shortcomings.
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their concerns are often either ignored or improperly handled.109
Additionally, timing is critical for victims escaping their abusers, but harsh
time requirements and bureaucratic mazes can prevent access to these
benefits. Welfare policy should not subject these victims to further abuse
by providing government assistance rife with harsh requirements and
foreclosing access to assistance, as TANF essentially does today. If we do
not succeed in comprehensive reform of TANF, which acknowledges that
screening out all victims is practically impossible, domestic violence
victims will continue to be suffocated by two worlds of oppression.
The history of welfare indicates that welfare policies have been crafted
in accordance with the stereotypes that poor women are lazy, dependent
minorities who want to take advantage of the system. However, the
stereotype of the welfare queen is not the norm. As a result, we need to
carefully scrutinize our welfare policies for mistaken attempts to address
this stereotype, rather than the realities of crippling poverty. In particular,
victims of domestic violence are illustrative of the fact that the lazy desires
of the welfare queen are not driving women to seek government assistance.
It is rather an attempt made in desperation as a last resort for most
survivors. As one caseworker noted in Legal Momentum‘s report,
―[TANF] is often the difference between a survivor jumping from shelter to
shelter, living in unsafe conditions, or returning to their abuser and actually
gaining their own safety, stability, and self-sufficiency.‖110
The failed implementation of the Family Violence Option is due in large
part to screening difficulties and other inherent realities of domestic
violence. Because we cannot assure detection of all welfare applicants who
should trigger its provisions, its intention to aid domestic violence victims
is not manifesting itself as reality, and must be reformed. Reform requires
replacing the inadequate, voluntary system of state discretion encapsulated
in the Family Violence Option, with comprehensive and accessible benefits
to address the exacerbating issue of domestic violence for welfare
applicants. While some victims have managed to navigate the nearly
impossible bureaucracy, we still need an accommodating policy approach
so as not to leave others behind. This approach is consistent with many
legal principles geared towards eradicating sex discrimination, emphasizing
that even if some generalizations are true, we have to create policies that
judge people as individuals and not as members of a group.
Ultimately, without purging the particularly harsh welfare requirements
of TANF across the board, domestic violence victims will continue to slip
109. See State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9-11 (N.C. 1989) (documenting a situation
where a domestic violence victim ultimately kills her husband after years of abuse and
no assistance from authorities when approached).
110. CASEY ET AL., NOT ENOUGH, supra note 54, at 4.
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through the cracks, reinforcing poverty and abuse rather than eliminating it.
Thus an across the board approach is optimal. We have to increase the
benefits for everyone if we are committed to not sacrificing any innocent
victims. Factoring in the complications of domestic violence, my
suggestions for comprehensive reform include: 1) broadly incorporating
higher education incentives because education is statistically proven to lift
these victims out of poverty; 2) acknowledging realistic restraints on
beneficiaries‘ income potential for various factors that are often temporary
and suffocate domestic violence victims by eliminating the unrealistic work
requirements, time limits, family caps, immigrant restrictions, etc.
(accompanied by an in-depth analysis of any other restrictions that are not
proving to be effective); and 3) reinstating an enforceable right to benefits
for all recipients, similar to that of AFDC. Comprehensive welfare
subsidies are imperative for victims to escape the dominion of both
violence and poverty; thus, our welfare policies have to reflect this
understanding.
Realistically, however, welfare reform is a contentious issue, and our
public perceptions continue to be tainted by our sexist and racist history.
At a minimum, reauthorization must implement federal standards for
waivers and give states only the discretion to provide more leniency, not
more discipline. Because states now have the opportunity to pick and
choose how they exempt victims, waivers vary drastically across the
country, not only in frequency, but in substance. In some states, work and
child support requirements may be waived; in others almost all of TANF‘s
strictest requirements can be waived. If we achieve nothing else, we need
to prioritize creating mandatory waivers of time limits, work requirements,
and child support cooperation initiatives for screened victims, removing the
―option‖ from the Family Violence Option for these measures, but also
leaving the door open and encouraging states to use their discretion for
lifting all other restrictions when appropriate. The Hardship Exemption
should be amended, enabling states to provide waivers to all eligible
domestic violence victims, not just a portion. Finally, welfare caseworkers
need more sensitivity training to help promote more accurate identification
of probable domestic violence victims, including developing a broad
definition of ―domestic violence victim‖ recognizing and addressing the
realities of the cycle of violence in hopes that the purposes of including the
Family Violence Option in TANF will be better served. Without these
changes, victims of domestic violence will continue to be victimized not
only at home, but also by society in general.
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